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1 Introduction
”The current recession may slow globalization, including international migration. The key questions are how
migrant-receiving governments deal with the migrants who are now inside their borders and the migration
policies they adopt during recovery. A key challenge is to encourage migrant-receiving and migrant-sending
governments to cooperate to protect the rights of migrants, which also protects local workers by avoiding com-
petition based on exploitation”
- Philip Martin, University of California, Davis (2010)
The current recession has indeed affected Europe in ways that are unlikely to wane in the near future. The
slightly more distant future offers its own set of challenges from population ageing to growing inequality. In the
present, immigration has become not only a pressing concern for the European politicians, but also for the Eu-
ropean public. According to the Eurobarometer survey released in 2015 immigration has topped the economic
situation and unemployment, despite the on-going debt crisis in Greece, as the most serious concern currently
facing Europe. It with these motivations that this thesis seeks to answer why anti-immigrant parties have
gathered so much support in the recent past. The aim is to provide a better understanding of why immigration
is so controversial and what this implies for the future of Europe. The first part will establish the context for the
coming chapters through an overlook of migration in Europe. Some theory behind why people migrate will be
covered as well. The discussion will take a turn towards the political dimension, where a brief discussion about
the history of the anti-immigrant parties is provided. The second part will provide a literature review spanning
two separate strains of literature from economics, political science, and sociology. The literature review will be
connected with economic theory, as well as theory derived from the reviewed literature, in order to construct
empirically testable hypotheses. The final part of this thesis will attempt to test the hypotheses through an
econometric analysis. A two-step ordinary least squares model is used to analyze data from the six rounds of the
European Social Survey. The results of the two-steps are discussed separately, followed by a thorough discussion
of the empirical analysis in terms of the constructed hypotheses. A brief discussion of what the results entail
for the future immigration policy is presented before the final conclusion, which will offer brief suggestions for
future research, as well as policy advice that can be derived from the results.
1.1 Migration and Europe
1.1.1 Brief Overlook
European immigration, from the colonial times to the present, has gone through multiple trends: until the
20th century Europe was a net exporter of immigrants, as many Europeans would seek a better life in the
colonial nations or the New World (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2009). In the 20th century, particularly
after the Second World war, the migration patterns changed from emigrating away from Europe to internal
migration within Europe. By the 1960s, Northern Europe had become a net importer of immigrants from
Southern Europe, and in the late 1980s and 1990s, the fall of the Soviet Union and the later Balkan wars, led to
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large migration flows from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. However, the main topic of this thesis and the
most controversial type of migration is that which has happened from developing nations in Africa and Asia to
Europe in the past 40 or so years. The public discourse paints a picture of this type of migration as massive in
scale and fuelled by war and extreme poverty (De Haas 2008). The terrorist attacks that have occurred since
9/11, both in and out of Europe, have only fueled the controversy by creating an image of immigration from
certain parts of the world as inherently dangerous. In actual terms, however, those who end up being able to
migrate tend to not be the poorest within the source regions, but rather those wealthy enough to be able to
afford the journey (B. Chiswick and Hatton 2003). This alone limits the immigration flows significantly and
casts doubt on the fears of an overrun Europe.
In addition, immigration is sometimes presented as a solution to future challenges, such as labour short-
age and population ageing. The proponents argue that since the native fertility rates have decreased below
maintenance levels in many Western European nations, and as life expectancy has continued to grow, the only
solution to the challenge is to bring in more immigrants to upkeep the supply-ratio. The critics counter by
stating that the rate of immigration would have to massively grow in the coming decades for it to have any real
effect. In this sense, perhaps the fear of massive scale immigration is potentially directed towards a potential
future scenario rather than the present. Furthermore, some research has shown that the immigrant populations
tend to adapt to the native population’s fertility regimes and therefore the immigration populations will grow
old too and with an increasing speed (Bengtsson and Scott 2011).
It is important to understand why immigration happens to begin with. The changing migration flows from
emigration from Europe, to internal migration, and finally to external immigration are explained to a substantial
degree by the comparative economic conditions in the target and source regions (B. Chiswick and Hatton 2003).
To provide an example, the colonial times were marked with high demand for European labour in the colonial
states, as it was needed to establish a significant European presence in the region (Bodvarsson and Van den
Berg 2009). It is no surprise then that since it was relatively easy for Europeans to find employment outside of
Europe that they would proceed to emigrate.1
On the other hand, the period after the Second World War witnessed a large reconstruction effort in Europe
fuelled by the strong American economy. Indeed, the decades that followed are sometimes called the golden years
up to the 1970s, as they were marked with an unprecedented economic growth throughout Western Europe,
particularly in nations such as Germany and France. The rebuilding efforts led to such high demand for labour
that labour shortages were now a reality. This would cause an obvious economic pull effect on the Southern
European labour, thus leading to migration from south to north.
At the same time as Europe was prospering, the poor economic conditions and rapid population growth
implied particularly tough challenges for many developing nations. In this case, the difficulty of finding work
and the relatively poor living conditions created a push factor, leading people to find work outside their native
regions. As Europe was prospering and the colonial ties allowed relative ease of travel for mid-income nations,
it is also no surprise that migrants would often choose to relocate to Europe, the Middle East, and Northern
Africa (De Haas 2008). It can then be roughly summarized that when areas in Europe needed workers and areas
outside of Europe or within Europe needed work, the incentive for labour immigration was born. Of course the
1Another non-European example would be the oil crises in the 1970s. The sudden increases in revenues for the Gulf states
subsequently led to massive increases in demand for labour and thus mass migration from Asia in particular ensued. See (B.
Chiswick and Hatton 2003) for a more illustrative discussion on this.
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reasons for migration are more complicated than this, but the key macro factors are understood to have been
the central driving force (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2009).
In the mid-20th century many of the immigrants, both from Europe and outside of it, entered on guest worker
programs, highlighting the idea of immigrants at the time as temporary guests or rent workers. However, often
the national legislation would ultimately allow such immigrants to remain in the area even after the initial
work permit expired, provided that some relatively flexible conditions were satisfied (Bengtsson, Lundh, and
Scott 2005). The more humanitarian clauses in the legislation would also allow family reunification, that is
to bring their families from their native countries to Europe, for those who would decide to settle down. In
consequence, not only did the guest workers remain in large numbers, as little return migration occurred, but
they were able to bring their families over as well. European countries had thus largely miscalculated the nature
of immigration, as the guest workers were not the temporary labour force they were thought to be, but rather
new permanent residents.
To complicate the matter, it has been shown that immigrant populations tend to have higher fertility rates
across generations than the native populations(Akkerman 2015). Consequently, the parts of the populations
with parents or grandparents born outside of Europe have rapidly grown in size. Currently, Germany has an
11,9 percent immigrant population, United Kingdom 12,4 percent, France 11,6 percent, Spain 13,8 percent, Italy
9,4 percent, Sweden 15,9 percent, Austria 15,7 percent, and Denmark 9,9 percent2. As the original demand
for labour, which pulled the immigrants to the country, has declined and a large number of immigrants have
come under asylum seeking or family reunification, the situation for immigrants has largely deteriorated (OECD
n.d.). This is rather paradoxical, as on the one hand they will benefit from the rising living standards, but on
the other hand they face obstacles such as the lack of country-specific skills, language barriers, social networks,
and even discrimination (B. R. Chiswick 1978).
The effect can be seen in table 1, as nearly across the spectrum the foreign-born population have a signifi-
cantly higher unemployment rates than than the native-born population. In many cases the rates are more than
twice as high as native-born unemployment, and in every case at least a percentage-point higher. The highest
foreign-born unemployment rates can be found in Finland, France, Sweden, and more recently in Italy and
Austria as well. Together with the potential unrest that might follow from the lack of integration and unem-
ployment, it follows that immigration can create a disproportionate pressure on some EU member states. This
highlights why immigration is an large concern and why integration and immigration policy are so important
in contemporary Europe. In this context, it is not only of interest to social scientists but also for policy makers
to study this topic, as the presence of anti-immigrant parties has the potential to exert significant influence on
future policy
1.1.2 The Rise of the Populist Anti-Immigrant Parties
Although Europe has had a long history with xenophobia and negative attitudes towards immigrants, largely in
response to changing demographics, many anti-immigrants parties have arisen in the political field in the last 30
or 40 years. First, the Freedom Party in Austria gained serious support in the 1980s and managed to gain 26,9
percent of the parliamentary votes in 1999. The second obvious example has been Vlaam’s Blok in Belgium,
who managed to gain 24,15 percent of the votes in 2004. Others have enjoyed moderate to large success in
2Numbers taken from national population databases, e.g. Statistics Finland
5
Table 1: Unemployment Rates for Foreign-born and Native-born Populations (F = Foreign-born N = Native-
born
Year 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Place of Birth F N F N F N F N F N F N
Country
Austria 8 4 13 5 8 4 7 3 14 7 15 7
Finland 19 10 23 10 18 9 13 6 17 8 14 8
France 20 8 14 9 14 8 12 7 15 9 16 9
Italy 9 9 10 8 8 7 8 7 11 8 14 10
Netherlands 5 2 10 4 11 4 6 2 9 4 11 5
Norway 8 4 8 4 8 3 5 2 9 3 7 3
Sweden 10 4 13 6 13 6 12 5 16 7 16 6
Switzerland 2 2 3 3 3 3 N/A N/A 8 3 7 3
UK 8 5 7 4 8 5 7 6 9 8 9 8
a Data extracted on 10 Aug 2015 from OECD.Stat
the 1990s as well, such as the Progress Party in Norway, and the People’s Party in Denmark and Switzerland.
Although the success of the older anti-immigrant parties has come to a halt in some instances and they have
endured controversies, which have damaged their status 3 a new wave has risen in the other Nordic countries,
Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Currently the majority of Western European nations
have an active anti-immigrant party with at least 10 percent of seats in national parliament (table 2), suggesting
that immigration is a topic in politics that is here to stay and will likely increase in intensity in the coming
years.
Table 2 illustrates the recent developments in the political field well. The columns represent the last five
national parliamentary election results for each anti-immigrant party. The first wave consisting of the Freedom
Party in Austria, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, and Lega Nord were the most popular anti-immigrant parties in
the 1990s and still retain significant support at 40/183 seats, 6/150 seats, and 20/630 seats respectively. In
Sweden and Finland the True Finns and the Swedish Democrats have gained electoral success only in the late
21st century with the former currently holding 38/200 seats and the latter 49/349 seats. The People’s Party
in Denmark and the Progress Party in Norway have maintained steady presence ever since the 90s with the
Danish People’s Party currently holding 37/175 seats and the latter 29/169 seats. The French National Front
and the United Kingdom Independence Party appears as if their voter bases are largely insignificant, however,
they have enjoyed far larger support than the number of seats in the table shows: UKIP has received over 10
percent of the votes in the 2015 national elections and National Front in 2004, with the most recent percentage
being 8,4. Currently both also have 24 out of 74 national seats in the European Parliament4.
3E.g. Vlaams Blok was ruled illegal under anti-racism laws. The continuation of Vlaams Blok is now known as Vlaams Belang,
but it no longer enjoys similar success as the original party. Also, the Freedom Party in Austria has split into two competing
parties, thus diminishing its role as well.
4Numbers taken from the the national election sites
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Table 2: Number of Parliamentary Seats in the Last Five National Elections
Party 5th 4th 3rd 2nd 1st Total Seats Available
True Finns (Finland) 1 3 5 39 38 200
1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 (max 38)
Swedish Democrats (Sweden) 0 0 0 20 49 349
2001 2005 2007 2011 2015 (max 49)
People’s Party (Denmark) 22 24 25 22 37 175
1995 1999 2004 2009 2014 (max 37)
Vlaams Belang (Belgium) 15 20 32 21 6 159
1993 1997 2002 2007 2012 (max 32)
National Front (France) 0 1 0 0 2 577
1999 2002 2006 2008 2013 (max 2)
Freedom Party (Austria) 52 18 21 34 40 183
1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 (max 52)
Lega Nord (Italy) 59 30 28 60 20 630
1996 2001 2006 2010 2012 (max 60)
Party for Freedom (Netherlands) N/A N/A 9 24 15 150
1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 (max 24)
Progress Party (Norway) 25 26 38 49 29 169
1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 (max 49)
People’s Party (Switzerland) 29 44 55 62 54 200
1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 (max 62)
Indepdence Party (UK) 0 0 0 0 1 650
1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 (max 1)
a Gathered from national election result databases
b Too much should not be drawn from these numbers as different electoral systems are not com-
parable
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2 Literature Review and Theory
2.1 Literature Review
The previous research on the topic can be categorized into two strains of literature with either a country or
cross-country focus: the first strain deals with the causes of anti-immigrant party success, while the second with
the covers causes of anti-immigrant opinion. Although the literature can be categorized in this way, this is not
to say that the literature within each respective strain is always connected. One reason for this is certainly
that some research has come from the field of economics while the others have come from political science or
sociology. Thus, unsurprisingly, different aspects are emphasized depending on the field. Despite this, important
contributions have been made across the spectrum and while no consensus appears to have been born, similar
findings have still been made.
Anderson (1996) differentiates between the economic, political and temporal variables in explaining the
success of the progress parties in Denmark and Norway. As the support for the parties was found to be similar
5 along with the similarity of the nations themselves, the setting provides a fine opportunity to attempt see if
their success is indeed driven by the same factors. The study uses data from national questionnaires, which
measure potential support via hypothetical questions, such as ”which party would you vote for?”. Somewhat
surprisingly, the results suggest that that in the Danish case economic factors measured through unemployment
are significant, as is the electoral momentum, and size of the foreign-born population. That is, the party
gains initial success with the growing number of immigrants and grows with the momentum gained from poor
economic situations. In the Norwegian case, on the other hand, none of the variables, with the relatively weak
exception of the size of the immigrant population, provide a good predictor for the success of the party. The
study concludes then that even in a very similar context, the success of the parties may be driven by very
different factors.
In a similar vein, Rink, Phalet, and Swyngedouw (2009) studied voting for Vlaam’s Blok in Belgium between
1991 and 1999. Among the most important determinants of voting behaviour were the size of the immigrant
population, which had a curvilinear effect on voting, while on the other hand, unemployment was found to have
only a small effect. Individual factors such as low-skill occupations and limited education were also important
predictors. The implication for the Dutch case would thus be that the economic context matters less than the
socio-economic status itself.
Boomgarden and Vliegenhard (2012) note that previous research has largely focused on macro-level data
and variables such as unemployment, immigrant demographics, and the electoral system. As such, they tap on
a largely neglected yet important aspect of the debate, that is the role of mass media and perception rather
than the actual status of the society. They analyse the content of five most-read Dutch newspapers, where
articles relating to immigration, unemployment, and party support are chosen and subsequently evaluated
against a visibility factor. The findings include that immigration-related news contents are significant and
more important than economic news contents. The authors discuss the implication and argue that it is not
the economic challenges but the perception of a cultural challenge that is the key variable. Similar results are
found in earlier research as well, with a less technical analysis (see for exmaple, WWalgrave and de Swert 2004,
Dearing and Rogers 1996).
57.4 ad 6.3 percent respectively
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Van Klingeren et al. (2014) continue on the analysis of media content by comparing the situation in Nether-
lands to Denmark. They seek to find out to which extent the media is more important than the reality, such
as the actual size of the immigrant population or the actual state of the economy. Contrary to other research
on the subject, the study takes into account the role of positive and negative news rather than aggregating it
all into one as Boomgarden and Vliegehard did. Again, it is shown that country level-factors are important,
as the role of media content has a smaller effect in Denmark than in Netherlands. The authors speculate that
the this is because in Denmark the media tone is more polarized to begin with. Thus whereas the discourse in
Netherlands may have an effect on a ”critical mass”, in Denmark the opinions are made up to begin with and
thus smaller effect is observed.
Although much can be learned from research on individual countries, due to the heterogeneity of the results
it is difficult to make generalizations. For this reason there is also a substantial body of work on the topic
addressing the overall popularity of anti-immigrant parties in Europe in the 20th century.
Van Der Brug et al have performed much work on this topic. In their first study on the subject (2000)
a macro perspective is chosen to assess the that voting for anti-immigrant parties is a protest against the
mainstream parties rather than that they are attractive to the voter on their own right. The data is cross-
sectional and taken from the European Elections Study (1994) to determine why some anti-immigrant parties
fail and others succeed. They perform an OLS regression analysis using Austria, Denmark, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. Their focus is on the supply-side of the debate and thus party differences
are being measured. They find little evidence that supports the protest vote hypothesis. Instead the electoral
institutions, such as other parties and their contemporary situations, are significant explanations.
Van Der Brug et al (2003) use the same method and set of hypothesis again on the data from a latter
European Elections Study (1999). The results suggest that the story is dynamic rather than static, as protest
votes appear to have become more common than they previously were. However, not too much has changed,
for the ideological match between the voter and the anti-immigrant party is still the dominant explanation. In
the cases where it is no longer the dominant factor, as in the case of the Belgian National Front, the German
Republicans, and the Dutch Centre Democrats, these parties have also turned out to be relatively unsuccessful.
The paper’s conclusion is then that anti-immigrant parties present an alternative to the mainstream parties,
and as long as they provide an ideologically sound alternative rather than a gimmick, they are likely to survive
past the short-run.
The other strain of literature engages the topic by looking into what determines public attitudes towards
immigrants. The general findings have been somewhat surprising, as the public opinion has changed surprisingly
little.
David Card (2002) analyses the first European Social Survey from 2002 to break down the compositional
effect of immigration. The study provides a robust technical analysis using rotational questions found only in
the first ESS. Card finds that economic factors are important, but most of the variation on whether immigration
is considered good or bad is determined by the composition of the immigrant population. In other words, it does
not only matter if the immigrants are skilled or non-skilled but it also matters who they are and where they do
come from. The respondents to the ESS seem to then distinguish between the fiscal effect of immigration and
the composition of the immigration population, and indeed the latter is determined to be more important for
immigration policy.
Hatton (2014) contributes on the same line of research as Card. His analysis consists of 20 countries, for
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which there is data before and after the year 2008, to answer if recession has changed minds in regards to
immigration. The method used consists of a two-step model with country, time, and individual factors being
analysed. In the first step, the questions on immigration are regressed on the country, time and individual
factors, with the aim of generating the country-level time effects. The second step regresses the country-
level time effects on macroeconomic five macroeconomic variables. On the individual-level, the respondent’s
age, birth in the country, labour force participation, and low education are found to have a negative effect
on the opinion on immigration. On the country-level there is large variance in the results between countries
and the country-level time factors are found to have a very small effect, which indicates that the opinion on
immigration is rigid and not easily affected by economic shocks. The variable most affected is the question
if immigration negatively affects the economy. Hatton also tests six additional questions relating to human
values, such as safety in surroundings, trusting other people, and importance of traditions, as well as political
orientation, such as trust in politicians, satisfaction in government, and where the respondent places on the
left-right scale. Of these questions, only safety in surroundings and importance of tradition are uncorrelated
over time with opinions on immigration. Interestingly, mistrust in politicians and lack of satisfaction with the
government are both correlated with the share of social benefits and unemployment. However, when controlling
for macroeconomic factors only the effects of trust in people and trust in politicians remain significant. This
suggests that the state of the economy is more important than the government, whereas distrust in people
overall and in politicians drives anti-immigrant opinions. There is country-level variation with North, such as
Finland and Norway, having a more positive opinion on immigration, while South, such as Italy and Greece,
having a more negative effect, possibly due to being hit harder by the recession. However, the results suggest
that cross-sectional socio-demographic factors are more important. The study also finds little evidence of a shift
in the political spectrum from left to right. The key finding of the study is that overall, the recession has had
a surprisingly small effect on the anti-immigrant opinion.
Elise Rustenbach (2010) uses the European Social Survey together with regional data from Eurostat much
in the same vein as Hatton. The analysis is broader, however, and in total eight theories are tested: cultural
marginality, human capital, political affiliation, societal integration, neighbourhood safety, contact, foreign
investment and economic competition. A two-step approach is adopted to factor in for individual, regional and
national variance. The results speak the same story for the most part as the majority of previous research.
Educational attainment, left-right political leaning, interpersonal trust, as well as unemployment, are major
predictors of anti-immigrant opinion. However, contrary to economic logic, unemployment is associated with
lower degrees of anti-immigrant opinion, both at a regional and national-level. Importantly, the number of
immigrants is not found to be significant either.
Finseraas, Pedersen, and Bay have also studied anti-immigrant attitudes using the ESS and its first five
rounds. Their analysis consists of testing the relative importance of economic and socio-tropic variables, and in
particular, the importance of unemployment within different demographic segments in those European countries,
which are part of the OECD. The apriori expectation is that unemployment only affects economic concerns
related to immigration and not cultural concerns. Thus the dependent variables are based on the same questions
as in Hatton’s study, except only two of them are used. The main independent variables are the respondents’
level of education, unemployment rate, the size of the foreign population, and the interaction between the
two. They also use a two-step model, however, with a different method. In the first step, they regress the
individual-level control variables for each country-level time period. In the second step, the intercept and slope
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coefficients are used as independent variables together with the macro-level variables, as well as country and time
fixed effects. The focus is on the second-step, where the results suggest that the negative relationship between
immigrants and education becomes steeper with higher unemployment, larger size of the foreign population,
and the interaction of the two variables. Moreover, for those with low education, an increase in unemployment
is found to be more important than then the size of the foreign population.
Anna Maria Mayda (2006) provides similar analysis on a different sample. The analysis makes use of the
International Social Survey Programme and the World Value Survey. This analysis is broader than what has been
discussed so far, as many non-European countries are discussed as well. The results emphasize the importance
of economic variables, as well as the labour market, and the author rejects the claim that immigration attitudes
are shaped entirely by non-economic variables. However, the study also finds that non-economic variables as a
whole appear to be explain more of the variance in the sample. In addition, the study finds that the higher the
per-capita GDP the country has, the less open they are to immigration.
The only obvious conclusion to be drawn based on the three strains of literature appears to be that the
success of the anti-immigrant parties are not driven by any single factor. The role of media, the economic
context, the individual socio-economic status, as well as the structure of the political system have been found
to be significant factors. Furthermore, their importance appears to vary depending on the region that is being
measured. The anti-immigrant sentiments, on the other hand, are largely driven by the individual’s socio-
economic status, the composition of the immigrant population, and the lack of interpersonal trust. Perhaps
the most important determinant on the individual level is the socio-economic status, and in particular the
individuals level of education, where those with higher education are on average significantly more tolerant,
regardless of the region.
A problem with the existing literature is that the focus tends to be either on explaining why anti-immigrant
parties rise to success or what determines public anti-immigrant attitudes. The two topics are thus treated
as separate topics. No study so far, that I know of, has attempted to connect the analysis of the two strains
of literature by using the European Social Survey to analyse individual and country factors, where the key
dependent variable is part preference. It is not clear to which extent anti-immigrant attitudes are driving the
rise of the anti-immigrant parties. Certainly there appears to be a disconnection there, as the recession has not
substantially changed minds. Why then have the anti-immigrant parties consolidated their status? Furthermore,
none of the previous studies discussed here have looked into the financial crisis and the potential momentum
it has given to the anti-immigrant parties. It can be argued that even if the public opinion of immigration is
rigid, it is the political field which can have the bigger impact on immigrant lives and immigration itself. Since
immigration is highly likely to persist in the foreseeable future as a major issue in European politics, a study
that focuses on the anti-immigrant parties could provide clarity to understand the contemporary immigration
debate.
With this in mind the research question this thesis attempts to answer is who identifies with anti-immigrant
parties and why. The aim of this thesis is then to provide insight into a pressing and relevant contemporary
topic and to contribute to the academic discussion by connecting the reviewed literature on anti-immigrant
opinion and anti-immigrant parties. The next section will discuss the relevant theory, which has largely been
used in the previous research as well, and to establish empirically testable hypotheses. Finally, an empirical
analysis is performed using the six waves of the European Social Survey with anti-immigrant party preference
as the dependent variable.
11
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Economics of Immigration
The basic economic theory provides the foundation which can be used to analyse attitudes towards immigration
both on an individual and party level. The standard neoclassical theory on labour markets predicts that if
immigrants are substitutes to the native workforce, it will then increase the labour force and thus lead the
supply curve to shift to the right. In practical terms this implies a downward pressure on wages as competition
increases, which in turn pushes employment levels to increase due to labour becoming cheaper. On the other
hand, it can be expected that the native workforce will resist working at a lower wage, at least in a inflexible
labour market, thus increasing unemployment among the native workforce, implying that the labour benefits
of immigration are largely reaped by the immigrants themselves. In the alternative case, if the immigrants are
not substitutes, but rather complements to the native workforce, then the results are completely different than
in the earlier case. In this case the demand curve will move left due to new skills that the economy can utilize.
The supply curve does not move in this instance, which implies that there is no clear competition among the
native and immigrant workforces, thus new job opportunities are created due to the new skills. The resulting
scenario would generate potentially higher wages and higher employment rate for both the native and immigrant
workforce.
Figure 1: Immigrants as Substitutes
Figure 2
The basic model cannot be applied so easily on reality, and immigrants are, even in the simplest case, at
least partially supplementary and partially complementary. An easy way to illustrate this, and also to help
think about immigration, is to consider the following scenario: Assume that the source nation has lower general
education and skill level than the target nation, it can then be reasoned that on average, most of the immigrants
are substitutes to the low-skilled native workers and complements to the high-skilled native workers. Again,
if the opposite is true than the skills and education are higher, then the immigrants are complementary to
the low-skilled native workers and substitutes to the high-skilled native workers. Depending on what type
of immigration a country receives, it can then be expected that either low-skilled or high-skilled will react
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Figure 2: Immigrants as Complements
negatively to immigrants due to the increased labour market competition.
Although economic theory provides the labour market competition as a way to understand anti-immigrant
sentiments, there are further reasons to believe that the public would be against immigration. Paradoxically,
George Borjas (1994)has shown that immigration has a positive effect on the economy only on the condition
that it actually does affect the native wages. When the wages remain the same despite immigration, immigrants
reap the entire benefit of migration due to their increased wage 6.Furthermore, if there is no effect on wages
and thus no labour market gain from immigration, it is reasonable to infer that the increased costs from factors
such as social security, integration efforts, and other public spending, will lead to a fiscal impact. It follows then
that immigration must affect the labour market equilibrium for there to be an economic benefit.
Another aspect to consider, is that for there to be an effect on wages, it is a necessary condition that the
immigrants and the native workforce have a distinct set of skills Borjas 1994. When this is not the case, the only
effect immigration has on the labour market is enlargement. What this means is that highly skilled societies
tend to benefit more from low skilled immigrants and low skilled societies tend to benefit more from high skilled
immigrants, due to the complement effect that will otherwise be missing.
In order to suggest that immigration has a positive consequence on the society, as long as the aforementioned
conditions of substitution and complementation are satisfied, the distributional properties of immigrants must
also be discussed. Considering the case where immigration affects wages negatively, it is unlikely that the
benefits will be shared equally across the economy. Instead, the benefits tend to fall disproportionally to those
employers who are able to make use of the immigrant work force. The conclusion is then that although on
utilitarian terms immigrant can be beneficial, it is not necessary so for different groups in the economy. This
highlights the importance of analysing which groups tend to be more anti-immigrant and whether this translates
to party support.
The economic theory discussed so far provides a theoretical framework through which to analyse anti-
6It has been suggested in alternative research that immigrants tend to adapt their frame-of-reference to the local setting. That
is, an immigrant who moves from a poor region to a rich region will perhaps win in the short-run, but they will soon assess
their relative position in the society from the standpoint of the target nation, thus not having gained as much, assuming that the
immigrant is a low-skill worker.
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immigrant sentiments. The lower the socio-economic status of the native worker, the more likely they are to
be against immigration, as they are less likely to reap the societal benefits. Also, they are more likely to face a
steeper competition in the labour market, if the immigration inflows consists mainly of low-skilled immigrants.
On the other hand, the higher the socio-economic status, the more positive their attitude is likely to be, as
they are more likely to be complementary to immigrants, and they are also more likely to be able to reap the
aggregate benefits.
It seems plausible also to suggest that it is not economic competition alone, but also the fiscal effect which
could be driving the anti-immigrant attitudes. Importantly, some other research suggests that so far immigration
has encumbered a net cost on the target nations, somewhere in the realm of 0.5 to 2 percent of the annual GDP
(OECD2014). Consequently, if immigrants are a burden to the state, this would imply that indeed immigrants
are reaping at least some benefits, even if no competition effect is happening. Therefore, two hypotheses that
will be tested on the country level are:
2.2.2 Other Considerations and the Hypotheses
Although economic theory and literature provides a solid foundation from which to begin the analysis, there are
many reasons to believe that non-economic factors play important roles as well, as was found in the literature:
These other factors are sometimes called socio-tropic threat (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) and they deal with
issues that relate to cultural, societal or even psychological issues.
Firstly, some anti-immigrant parties emphasize the threat of non-Western religion. The proponents of this
idea tend to put forward an implicit claim that European nations are culturally similar, whereas immigrants
from developing nations are dissimilar, and therefore unable to integrate to the target country society. It
is argued that the cultural distance leads to a level of unrest, not only between the native and immigration
populations, but also within the immigrant populations. The latter follows because immigrant populations are
not a homogeneous group, but normally very heterogeneous instead. It is also commonly found that immigrants
from different areas tend to have different crime rates than one another. The importance of composition of the
immigrant population is therefore central and anti-immigrant attitudes can stem from lack of integration due
to cultural distance.
• The 1st hypothesis is that individuals who prefer anti-immigrant parties are more negative towards immi-
gration that is culturally distant. In addition, such individuals are also more likely to be concerned about
the cultural effect of immigration rather than the economic effect.
Secondly, as has been argued in some of the earlier research, the role of media can be integral (Boomgaarden
and Vliegenthart 2007 and Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, and Van Spanje 2012). It is here that the role of political
parties can become particularly crucial, regardless of what factual factors can affect anti-immigrant opinions, if
media publishes content that sensationalist, then potentially the actual situation can be secondary. To illustrate,
if unemployment affects voting for an anti-immigrant party, but the unemployment rates are not particularly
high, the effect might be insignificant. However, if the media content pushes the idea of unemployment as being
much higher than it actually is, then the public opinion might shift regardless of the actual situation.
• The 2nd hypothesis is then that media has a significant effect on the probability of preferring an anti-
immigrant party
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Thirdly, a key finding in some of the studies was the role, or lack thereof, of interpersonal trust. Relating
to the role of education, if the public has not come in contact with immigrants, particularly those who are
culturally distant, they might hold preconceived notions about them, which will in turn affect their preferences.
However, rather than discussing only the social contact theory, it is important to note that many anti-immigrant
parties are not identified solely as anti-immigrant, but also as euro-skeptics in opposition to the mainstream
politicians. It can then be expected that their popularity is driven by distrust not only towards other people,
but also towards institutions.
• The 3rd hypothesis is that interpersonal trust has at least two components in regards to preferring anti-
immigrant parties: distrust towards other people and distrust towards political institutions
Fourthly, one common factor across the previous literature seems to be the role of education in countering
anti-immigrant attitudes. There are different mechanisms through which this could happen. One relates to
economic competition as the skills and specialization gained through education make them less likely to be
substitutes to immigrants. On the other hand, education could also provide a better knowledge of the effects of
immigration on society, so it can be evaluated on a more neutral basis. It could also be that education is a good
route through which to become acquainted with immigrants and foreigners in general, thus creating exposure
and contact, which will reduce pre-conceived opinions.
• The 4th hypothesis is then that the higher the individual’s education the less likely an individual is to
prefer an anti-immigrant party.
As for the country-level factors, if anti-immigrant parties are not only a consequence, but also a cause of
attitudes towards immigration. It could be that the small role for unemployment in determining attitudes
towards immigration that was found by Hatton (2014) is masked by the choice of the dependent variable. That
is to say that unemployment may not affect anti-immigrant attitudes too much, but it may be a key factor in
determining the success of an anti-immigrant party. Potentially, this could also lead to a circular mechanism,
where unemployment affects anti-immigrant party preference, which affects attitudes towards immigration and
again leads to an increasing support for anti-immigrant parties.
There are at least three ways in which way the original effect could occur. Firstly, unemployment in a region
may affect the behaviour of other people within the region and their behaviour in turn can affect the behaviour
of the individual in question. Secondly, unemployment in the region can affect economic opportunities in the
region, thus creating a fear-factor, as well as support for a political alternative, due to a perceived failure of the
reigning government. Thirdly, high unemployment could also potentially induce a greater media visibility for
anti-immigrant parties, thus giving them more opportunities to gain support.
• The fifth hypothesis is then that unemployment is a key country-level factor in determining anti-immigrant
party success.
Overall, the hypotheses are contrived with the aim of confirming previous results and to explicitly link anti-
immigrant opinions to anti-immigrant parties. As the variable of interest will be the probability of preferring
an anti-immigrant party, the empirical analysis will be able to also test the sensitivity of the results with
composition adjustments. For example, it is of interest whether those who prefer anti-immigrant parties are
mostly affected by the effect of immigrants on the economy, culture, or the country as a whole. Alternatively,
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it can be tested if the economic status or the cultural distance of the immigrant matters more. Furthermore,
the approach allows the assessment of the relative importance of institutional distrust versus anti-immigrant
opinions. It is difficult to find guidance from theory or even the earlier research on the relative weightings of
these considerations, and for this reason they are not tested with explicit hypotheses. It is expected, however,
that they will be significant factors.
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3 Data and Methods
3.1 European Social Survey
The data used in the empirical analysis section is taken from the European Social Survey. The ESS is a repeated
cross-sectional survey collected every other year since the year 2002. However, the latest survey from 2014 has
not yet been released, so the analysis is limited to first the six waves from 2002 to 2012. The respondents to the
survey are a random sample and their answers are collected through one hour long face-to-face interviews. The
topics in the survey cover politics, values, cultures, as well as socio-demographic backgrounds. Some questions
relating to these topics are covered only in one or two rounds, and for this reason, only those questions which
are collected in each survey are included.
The analysis will also not cover all European countries present in the survey, as not all of them have an
explicit anti-immigrant party with a significant following. In addition, it is probable that the rise of anti-
immigrant parties in Eastern Europe are driven by different mechanisms than the Western European countries,
as their electoral systems and voting systems are very different. For this reason, it is risky to fit them under
one model even with controlling for unobserved country effects, which is why only the following 11 Western
European countries are included: Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, France, UK, Italy, Finland,
Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Additionally, some countries are omitted from different rounds, such as Austria
from the 3rd to 6th rounds, as their results still remain unpublished, so the analysis will be incomplete in some
cases.
Applying these limitations, the dataset has altogether 111,115 observations, with each country having roughly
between 800 and 1500 observations per round, depending on the size of the population. In general, the smaller
the nation the fewer respondents there are and vice versa. The number of observations can be balanced according
to post-stratification weights, which can reduce sampling bias and potential non-response bias, in the event that
there is some linear dependency between the variable or response of interest and the variables used for post-
stratification (ESS Round 6: European Social Survey (2014): ESS-6 2012 Documentation Report. Edition 2.1.
Bergen, European Social Survey Data Archive, Norwegian Social Science Data Services. N.d.). These weights
are provided by the ESS itself and therefore no construction is required.
There are some further issues in the data that warrant discussion, such as the large number of missing
variables or refusals to answer particular questions. This provides a serious challenge as it is likely that such
answers are not missing randomly, and since the dependent variable is binary, and many of the explanatory
variables are continuous, the missing variables cannot be coded differently for analysis. For this reason, any
refusals to answer and any missing observations are dropped from the analysis. This unfortunately will limit the
scope of the final interpretation as the sample will suffer from self-selection bias and thus the results cannot and
should not be generalized too far. At best, the results can be used to extrapolate to that part of the population,
which feels strong enough about politics to openly declare feeling closest to a particular party.
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the final data-set. Roughly half of the sample has been cut and 54650
observations are left. However, the number of observations vary a little according to the number of missing
responses in some of the explanatory variables. Those variables which have value from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 2
are binary, and the rest are continuous, with the exception of education, which is categorical. Preferring an
anti-immigrant party has been coded so that 1 means the respondent prefers an anti-immigrant party and 0
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means the respondent prefers a non-anti-immigrant party. The responses to explanatory variables have been
coded so that a higher value means a negative response for the variables immigrants are bad for the economy,
immigrants are bad for the culture, immigrants are bad for the country, allow immigrants of the same ethnicity,
allow immigrants of a different ethnicity, as well as allow poor immigrants. In addition, the values of the first
three variables have been transformed from 0 to 10 to 1 to 4, so that comparison is easier 7. Therefore, a higher
value for immigrants are bad for the economy means the respondent thinks immigrants are not good for the
economy. As for the other variables, the interpretation can be somewhat confusing in comparison, because a
higher value means a positive response for variables trust people, trust politicians, trust EU, satisfied with the
state of the economy. Therefore, a high value for trust in EU means that the respondent has a complete trust
for EU and vice versa.
The numbers show the mean values for the variables across the sample and it can be seen that the vast
majority do not prefer an anti-immigrant party. People on average trust other people more, whereas politicians
and EU are less trusted, suggesting that institutions in general are seen as untrustworthy. The opinion on the
state of the economy is slightly more positive than negative, whereas all the immigrant variables are above two
indicating that on average people are slightly negative towards immigration. Upon further inspection, some
other points stand out as well: the overall opinion that immigrants are bad for the culture is lower than for the
other two options. This means that overall immigrants are thought to be better for the culture than for the
economy or country as a whole. The same applies for allowing immigrants of the same ethnicity, which has a
somewhat higher mean value. This indicates that the polarization on the whole sample, appears to be between
whether immigrants are good for the economy or good for the culture.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Micro-level Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Vote right-wing 54650 .091473 .2882832 0 1
Trust people 54574 6.009089 2.1965 0 10
Trust politicians 54329 4.684607 2.123648 0 10
Trust EU 50531 4.748333 2.235451 0 10
Satisfied with state of the economy 53943 5.556958 2.30024 0 10
Gender 54629 1.493236 .4999588 1 2
Age 54565 49.84488 18.0765 14 102
Education 54650 2.297694 .7902474 1 3
Immigrants bad for the economy 53613 2.472591 .9119132 1 4
Immigrants bad for the culture 53913 2.126129 .9724686 1 4
Immigrants bad for the country 53864 2.537632 .8838546 1 4
Allow immigrants of the same ethnicity 53779 2.072482 .7541703 1 4
Allow immigrants of a different ethnicity 53805 2.341046 .8172527 1 4
Allow poor immigrants 53728 2.403626 .8388382 1 4
a Data extracted on 10 Aug 2015 from OECD.Stat
7The same was done by hatton2014public
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3.2 Empirical Strategy and Model
A large obstacle that has been a problem for much of the earlier research, and which also haunts this analysis,
is that the type of available data is cross-sectional rather than panel data. This implies that many of the novel
control techniques that could be more appropriate and reliable cannot be used without making strong assump-
tions (Angrist and Pischke 2008). Moreover, identifying a quasi-experimental design, such as an instrumental
variable or difference-in-differences approach has so far proved to be insurmountable, meaning that causal in-
terpretations have not been drawn. In order to provide robust results it is necessary to discuss those methods
which can be applied to this research. Firstly, the model of choice is limited by hierarchical features of the
data. Some models such as pooled OLS with clustered standard errors can be used, but no information on the
parameters of the distribution of unobserved factors are obtained (Bryan and Jenkins 2013).
Another option is to run either fixed-effects or a random-effects models, which allow for proper control of the
country effects. However, specific limitations apply to these methods too, which is why an alternative method
is suggested by Mark and Jenkins (2014): a two-step pooled OLS model, where first the individual effects
are estimated with country-level dummies and then the country-level effects are estimated using the country
coefficients as the dependent variable. The MCMC simulations by Bryan and Jenkins suggest that it is the most
efficient and least biased estimator when the number of countries is below 25. However, even then the results
of the second-step are likely to be biased and inaccurate to a degree, but weaknesses are still minimized with
the chosen method. As the number of countries in the dataset increases then the use of other models becomes
more attractive. For example, logit and probit models are efficient when the number of countries is above 30.
Same applies to using clustered standard errors, which are too high in the presence of few countries. As the
number of countries is in this analysis is only 11, it is appropriate to use a two-step linear probability model.
The model can then be written as
Yict = Xictβ +Vct + ict with i, ...,Nc; = 1, ...,Ct, ...,T
where yict is the linear probability of feeling closest to an anti-immigrant party, Xictβ is a vector of individual
level covariates, Vct are the country and time fixed effects, and ict is the error term. The country and time
fixed effects are included as dummies to model some of the variation that occurs because of them. The covariates
are chosen based on the earlier theoretical discussion, where age, sex, and education are the standard socio-
demographic variates. The other covariates can be split into four categories: 1) interpersonal distrust, 2) media
and perception, 3) effect of immigration, 4) type of immigration. The first includes questions relating to trust in
people, politicians, parliament, and the EU. The second includes the time spent following political news on TV
and the perception of the state of the economy. The third includes the variables which deal with the variables
measuring the perceived impact of immigration, while the fourth deals with the preference for different types
of immigration. The purpose of this categorization is to test the hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 and to allow for
a clearer discussion of their relative importance by choosing to exclude them in different specifications. The
sensitivity analysis then means that it can be seen which of the four categories are the most interconnected. For
this reason, although the estimator used does not allow for a causal interpretation of the coefficients, it does
allow for a speculation of the causal channels.
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The second step of the regression analysis entails taking the coefficients for each country to obtain the
country-effect. The model is then written as
Vˆct = α+ Zctγ + ηc with c; = 1, ...,Ct, ...,T
Where Vct is the regression coefficient from the first-step, α is the constant, +Zctγ is the country and
time level covariates, and ηc is the error term. The first-step controls for variation on the individual level, so
the second-step will provide an estimate of the components of the country effects. Due to the low number of
observations it is crucial to save as many degrees of freedom as possible. For this reason only two covariates are
chosen. National unemployment to test the fifth hypothesis and immigrant inflows. The data for the second-
step is taken from the Eurostat database, where unemployment and the immigrant inflows are used from the
relevant years.
4 Results
4.1 First-step results
The first-step results are found on table 4. The first model includes all the covariates, the second excludes
the Distrust covariates, the third the Effects of Immigration covariates, the fourth the Type of Immigration
covariates, and the last excludes both the Effect and Type of Immigration covariates.
The first striking feature is that in the main model trust in politicians has the wrong sign as expected
although the coefficient is insignificant. Secondly, the amount of politics seen on the TV on a daily basis is
insignificant. This is probably explained by the measure being very crude to begin with, as it ignores for example
news from the printed media or the internet. Furthermore, it contains all news and not only immigration related
news. Thirdly, education, whether secondary or tertiary, is insignificant and tertiary education has the wrong
sign as well. This is very surprising, as according to the reviewed literature, education was a significant factor
across the spectrum. Satisfaction with the economy, as well as all the variables relating to immigration directly
are significant and they all have the correct sign. One exception remains, which is the curious case, that
not allowing immigrants of the same ethnicity as the majority, is negatively associated with anti-immigrant
party preference. This suggests that anti-immigrant parties are not against immigration per se, but against
immigrants of different ethnicity.
The other models reveal more. Removing Distrust variables in the second model changes the sign for
secondary education but it continues to remain insignificant. The distrust also affects satisfaction with the
current state of the economy as the variable becomes insignificant, although the coefficient changes little. The
immigration variables are largely unchanged with small variations in the coefficients. The third model removes
the Effects of Immigration and this also has little effect across the board, beside the sign change for the tertiary
education variable. The fourth model eliminates Type of Immigration variables and this appears not to change
the results greatly either. The largest effect is that the sign for tertiary education switches back to being
positively associated with anti-immigrant party preference, but the coefficient remains insignificant.
The most interesting results are obtained by removing all variables relating to immigration. Trust in people,
EU and the parliament remain significant and trust in politicians insignificant. The time spent watching politics
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on TV is also insignificant. Importantly, both secondary and tertiary education obtain the correct sign and
they also become significant at 10 percent and 5 percent level respectively in this model 8
Overall the results indicate that the effect from schooling may run through knowledge about immigration,
as the removal of Effects of Immigration appears to have a relatively large effect. On the other hand, this is
not enough by itself, as also the Type of Immigration variables must be removed for the education coefficients
to turn significant. As for the immigration variables themselves, they appear robust to the model specification,
and remain largely unaffected by it. Interestingly, culture seems to have the largest coefficient in the main
model at a 1,65 percent increase in the probability of preferring an anti-immigrant party for each unit increase
on the scale of opposition. For the economy and country variables the coefficient values suggest a 0.98 and a
0.87 percent increases respectively for each unit increase. For the compositional aspects there is a negligible
difference between allowing different ethnicities and poor immigrants, with both being associated with roughly
0,2 percent increase in probability per unit increase. The coefficient for allowing same ethnicity immigrants has
a slightly weaker effect at 0.13 percent decrease in the probability, for one unit increase in not allowing more of
the same ethnicity immigrants.
4.2 Second-step results
The results for the second-step of the model are presented on table 5. It is worth discussing the actual inter-
pretation of the coefficients, which can be somewhat tricky. The first-step estimates the fixed country effects,
which is now the dependent variable. Therefore, the second-step estimates the effects of unemployment and
immigrant inflows on the country fixed effects, when the individual preference is already controlled for. There-
fore, a negative value means that a variable reduces the the country effect of increasing the probability of
preferring an anti-immigrant party. As such, it is surprising to see that both of the coefficients are negative.
A percentage-point increase in unemployment, for example, leads to a 0.02 unit decrease in the country fixed
effects. An increase of thousand immigrants per year will lead to a 0.0003 unit decrease in the country fixed
effects. The high R-squared suggests that almost 40 percent of the variation is explained by the two variables.
However, it is pivotal to stress, that these results are not robust and that the country levels should be taken at
best as pointers. (Bryan and Jenkins 2013).
8To test if any particularly variable is more responsible than the other, a step by step removal of the variables has been conducted
as well, but it does not make a difference. All immigration variables must be uncontrolled for, for the coefficient to remain significant.
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Table 4: First-step models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Anti-immigrant Anti-immigrant Anti-immigrant Anti-immigrant Anti-immigrant
Trust people -0.00177** -0.00302*** -0.00236*** -0.00580***
(0.000853) (0.000837) (0.000845) (0.000824)
Trust EU -0.00580*** -0.00708*** -0.00588*** -0.00840***
(0.000944) (0.000934) (0.000935) (0.000930)
Trust parliament -0.00277*** -0.00361*** -0.00289*** -0.00488***
(0.00105) (0.00103) (0.00104) (0.00102)
Trust politicians 0.000602 0.000451 0.000745 0.000600
(0.00115) (0.00113) (0.00114) (0.00112)
TV politics 1 - 2,5 h 0.00471 0.00339 0.00310 0.00419 0.000969
(0.00348) (0.00337) (0.00344) (0.00345) (0.00342)
TV politicas 2,5+ h 0.0142 0.0135 0.0123 0.0184 0.0164
(0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0136)
Secondary education -0.00245 0.000781 -0.00557 -0.00310 -0.00969**
(0.00477) (0.00461) (0.00471) (0.00473) (0.00470)
Tertiary education 0.00360 0.00260 -0.00454 0.00126 -0.0181***
(0.00458) (0.00442) (0.00450) (0.00455) (0.00447)
Satisfied with economy 0.00292*** 0.000252 0.00251*** 0.00337*** 0.00252***
(0.000825) (0.000736) (0.000812) (0.000818) (0.000809)
Good for economy 0.00977*** 0.0115*** 0.0152***
(0.00220) (0.00213) (0.00214)
Good for culture 0.0165*** 0.0181*** 0.0226***
(0.00232) (0.00222) (0.00226)
Good for country 0.00867*** 0.00982*** 0.0144***
(0.00231) (0.00225) (0.00226)
Allow same immigrants -0.0138*** -0.0136*** -0.0112***
(0.00334) (0.00324) (0.00330)
Allow diff. immigrants 0.0210*** 0.0233*** 0.0309***
(0.00382) (0.00372) (0.00372)
allow poor immigrants 0.0220*** 0.0216*** 0.0283***
(0.00316) (0.00306) (0.00312)
Constant -0.0268** -0.0769*** 0.0384*** 0.000372 0.182***
(0.0128) (0.0113) (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0109)
Observations 42,800 45,865 43,674 43,476 44,499
R-squared 0.105 0.102 0.101 0.100 0.086
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Second-step model
(1)
VARIABLES Estimate
Unemployment -0.0197***
(0.00326)
Immigrant -0.000338***
(7.33e-05)
Constant 0.188***
(0.0209)
Observations 104
R-squared 0.437
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Immigrant inflows measured in
units of 1000s.
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5 Discussions
5.1 Is it culture, the economy, media, or education that ultimately matters?
The research question that this thesis sought to answer is who supports anti-immigrant parties and why. The
results largely support previous research although some of the results come as surprises. The first hypothesis to
be tested was that individuals who prefer anti-immigrant parties would be more negative towards immigration
that is culturally distant, and more concerned about the cultural effect of immigration, rather than the economic
effect. The results largely support the hypothesis as each model suggest that allowing ethnically different
immigrants is less desirable than ethnically similar immigrants. However, what is noteworthy is that anti-
immigrant party supporters are more likely to support same ethnicity immigration as non-anti immigrant party
supporters. Therefore, to classify anti-immigrant parties as anti-immigrant might be a mistaken label. The
result could be understood to suggest a degree of xenophobia within the supporter base as well. However, an
alternative explanation is that different ethnicity is associated with a different culture, which renders immigrants
from distant cultures less desirable. Indeed, immigrants in general are seen as more of a threat to the native
culture rather than to the native economy or to the country itself.
The second hypothesis was that media would have a significant effect on the probability of preferring an
anti-immigrant party. Indeed, the role of media has been emphasized by some scholars, but little evidence to
support its role is found in the analysis. A likely reason for this is that the unit of measurement ”time spent
watching political news on TV daily” is a very crude variable. It is unclear whether watching more political
news should increase or decrease support for anti-immigrant parties. A better control variable is required, so
that the actual content of the media and its effect is being measured, and not the amount of time spent following
the media. It could also be that any effect of the media is caught by the other control variables. However, no
specification produced significant coefficients in this instance. Worthy of nothing, however, that any study that
could control for media content will likely require a different approach and an experimental design should be
favored.
The third hypothesis stated that interpersonal trust has two or more components in regards to preferring
anti-immigrant parties. One of them being distrust towards other people and the other distrust towards political
institutions. The results indicate that euroskepticism is associated with a higher probability of preferring an
anti-immigrant party. However, the coefficient is smaller than for the anti-immigrant variables, meaning that
while important, EU is of lesser concern on average. As for the composition of the distrust, it appears that
distrust of the national government is more important than distrust of politicians, perhaps capturing the effect
that at least an anti-immigrant party, which are often in the opposition of the parliament, are trustworthy.
Distrust towards people is a significant variable as well, but noticeably lower so than distrust towards EU and
the parliament. This sheds some light towards earlier research, which paints a picture of an anti-immigrant
individual as distrustful in general. Although it may be true to an extent, these results show that the difference
is smaller than anticipated, when controlling for other factors. The distrust factors is potentially driven by the
distrust towards political institutions.
The fourth hypothesis was that the higher the individual’s education, the less likely they are to prefer an
anti-immigrant party. However, the important finding, that education is only significant when anti-immigrant
attitudes are not controlled for, indicates that the component in education that prevents support for anti-
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immigrant parties, may be knowledge about immigration. An alternative explanation could also be exposure
to immigrants from opportunities in school, or even new perspectives as schooling tends to break preconceived
notions. Regardless of the correct interpretation, it must be stressed that it is difficult to find an interpretation
that supports the labour market competition hypothesis. If the hypothesis were to hold, a significant result
could have been expected, when not controlling for which type of immigration to allow. As this did not change
the results, it could also be argued that education is simply a poor proxy for labour market skills.
The fifth hypothesis which stated that unemployment is a key country-level factor in determining anti-
immigrant party success is difficult to assess. On the one hand, the results were significant, but on the other
hand the coefficient was negative. The interpretation would mean that that country fixed effects diminish with
higher level of unemployment. This suggests that something happens during periods of unemployment, which
lowers preference towards anti-immigrant parties. Same can be said about immigration inflows, which also
turned out to have a negative impact. Potentially larger immigrant inflows, when all other things are held
constant, could create more contacts and exposure, through which the cultural fears are being overcome.
Having interpreted the results, it is important to state that the results, particularly those of the second-
step, are not necessarily robust. Firstly, the issue of missing variables limits the interpretation, as well as
generalization from sample to population. Secondly, the model is unlikely to have provided causal estimates
and therefore a degree inaccuracy should be expected. Thirdly, many studies have used the European Social
Survey data-set, so it is important that future research will attempt to replicate the results on a different sample
(9). On the other hand, the results appear robust to various specifications but any future research should still
attempt a different method on the same questions.
5.1.1 Immigration Policy and What Can We Expect from the Future?
The results suggest that anti-immigrant parties are here to stay. The fact that cultural and economic concerns
appear to be driving the anti-immigrant parties suggests that their support is relative rigid as well. However,
even without anti-immigrant parties Europe has already earned a reputation as ”Fortress Europe” at least since
the 1980s, due to the noticeably stricter stance on external immigrationDinan 2004. Yet many holes in the
European immigration policy remain and immigration, especially in the form of asylum seekers from culturally
distant locations, has continued to increase substantially. Due to the increased inflows of culturally distant
immigrants and the prolonged debt crisis, it can be expected that anti-immigrant parties are likely to continue
enjoying at least moderate success. Since it appears that reducing or even stopping immigration inflows is main
political agenda for these parties, it is reasonable to suggest that harsher attitudes can be expected if the parties
are able to enter the national governments.
The freedom of travel within the European Union is well connected to the issue. The increased movement
rate within the union enables immigrants to enter in one country and move relatively freely to another. Although
the natives do benefit from barriers to entry in the labour market, such as languages, social circles, cultural
know-how and so on, the single European market nevertheless can motivate a type of race to the bottom. The
country with the most hospitable labour market can be expected to see a larger number of immigrants, due to
the demographic pull factor. A potential consequence may be political pressure for Europe to coordinate its
immigration policy even further. Therefore, it is possible that anti-immigrant parties will find allies in other
9Of course, this too provides practical obstacles, as few surveys on the scale of the ESS exist.
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parties, as the non anti-immigrant parties will become more anti-immigrant. In support of this, it has been
argued that so far the driving force behind the transformation from Europe to ”Fortress Europe” has been the
mainstream right-wing parties (Mudde 2013).
5.2 Concluding remarks
This thesis sought to provide insight into why anti-immigrant parties have become so popular and what this
could mean for Europe. The general findings in the empirical analysis section support the notion that it is
less the economic factors and more so the cultural factors which drive anti-immigrant parties. What this
means for future immigration policy is that education of the general public is likely a key to generate more
neutral or positive attitudes towards different cultures and ethnicities It could be a resourceful topic for further
research to look into further. On the other hand, as cultural concerns were more important than economic
concerns, the implication is, as has been noted by others, that integration policy, which promotes cultural and
societal cooperation, could be effective in disarming anti-immigrant sentiments. Although economic concerns
had a lesser impact, they are still an issue. Furthermore, they are potentially harder to deal with. It can be
speculated that economic concerns are largely driven by the high unemployment rates within the foreign-born
populations. Therefore, integration policy is again a key, as placing the focus on finding ways to lower the
unemployment rates within the foreign-born population, could lead to results that disperse both economic and
cultural concerns. To measure what the role is of foreign-born unemployment rates in the rise of the anti-
immigrant parties and how it can affect it, is a topic that future research on this topic should focus. Indeed, as
it seems that anti-immigrant parties are here to stay and immigration policy does not seem to be the appropriate
tool to disperse anti-immigrant opinions, coming research and policy should place the emphasis on integration
policy over immigration policy.
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Appendix
Table 6: Summary Statics for Country and Time variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Belgium 54650 .0963403 .2950601 0 1
Switzerland 54650 .0893321 .2852251 0 1
Denmark 54650 .1152608 .3193393 0 1
Finland 54650 .1154437 .3195596 0 1
France 54650 .0819579 .2743031 0 1
UK 54650 .0959927 .2945839 0 1
Italy 54650 .0255078 .1576629 0 1
Netherlands 54650 .1028728 .3037955 0 1
Norway 54650 .115828 .3200215 0 1
Sweden 54650 .1094236 .3121728 0 1
ESS round 2 54650 .1966514 .3974702 0 1
ESS round 3 54650 .1708692 .376398 0 1
ESS round 4 54650 .172516 .3778318 0 1
ESS round 5 54650 .1587557 .3654515 0 1
ESS round 6 54650 .1043184 .3056759 0 1
a Data extracted on 10 Aug 2015 from OECD.Stat
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Table 7: Country and Time results for the first-step models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Anti-immigrant Anti-immigrant Anti-immigrant Anti-immigrant Anti-immigrant
Belgium 0.0168** 0.0102 0.0190*** 0.0133* 0.0140**
(0.00712) (0.00696) (0.00689) (0.00697) (0.00687)
Switzerland 0.227*** 0.224*** 0.225*** 0.226*** 0.216***
(0.0103) (0.00979) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0102)
Denmark 0.0359*** 0.0309*** 0.0372*** 0.0395*** 0.0419***
(0.00756) (0.00724) (0.00730) (0.00740) (0.00729)
Finland 0.0115* 0.00443 -0.00150 0.0220*** 0.00824
(0.00662) (0.00644) (0.00636) (0.00639) (0.00628)
France -0.0123* -0.0177** -0.00928 -0.0159** -0.0154**
(0.00727) (0.00714) (0.00722) (0.00707) (0.00718)
UK -0.0764*** -0.0770*** -0.0724*** -0.0779*** -0.0726***
(0.00623) (0.00600) (0.00600) (0.00602) (0.00588)
Italy 0.0131 0.00760 0.0206** 0.00336 0.00499
(0.00995) (0.00988) (0.00972) (0.00965) (0.00944)
Netherlands 0.144*** 0.135*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.141***
(0.00888) (0.00852) (0.00870) (0.00871) (0.00863)
Norway 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.106***
(0.00808) (0.00768) (0.00792) (0.00793) (0.00787)
Sweden -0.00127 -0.00459 -0.00376 -0.0165*** -0.0380***
(0.00623) (0.00600) (0.00591) (0.00596) (0.00577)
2 ESSround 0.00474 0.00582 0.00648 0.00649 0.00961**
(0.00458) (0.00441) (0.00451) (0.00453) (0.00448)
3 ESSround 0.00170 0.00444 0.00355 0.00506 0.00863*
(0.00490) (0.00473) (0.00483) (0.00486) (0.00481)
4 ESSround 0.0140*** 0.0121*** 0.0162*** 0.0156*** 0.0177***
(0.00484) (0.00466) (0.00480) (0.00480) (0.00478)
5 ESSround 0.0383*** 0.0428*** 0.0382*** 0.0403*** 0.0407***
(0.00539) (0.00523) (0.00531) (0.00534) (0.00527)
6 ESSround 0.0446*** 0.0468*** 0.0458*** 0.0460*** 0.0460***
(0.00579) (0.00572) (0.00575) (0.00573) (0.00571)
Female -0.0316*** -0.0337*** -0.0308*** -0.0332*** -0.0338***
(0.00299) (0.00291) (0.00294) (0.00297) (0.00294)
Age -0.000910*** -0.000850*** -0.000945*** -0.000720*** -0.000615***
(0.000103) (9.86e-05) (0.000102) (0.000101) (9.91e-05)
Observations 42,800 45,865 43,674 43,476 44,499
R-squared 0.105 0.102 0.101 0.100 0.086
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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